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A popular idea in cognitive neuroscience is that to predict others’ actions, observers need to map those
actions onto their own motor repertoire. If this is true, infants with a relatively limited motor repertoire
should be unable to predict actions with which they have no previous motor experience. We investigated
this idea by presenting pre-walking infants with videos of upright and inverted stepping actions that
were briefly occluded from view, followed by either a correct (time-coherent) or an incorrect (time-
incoherent) continuation of the action (Experiment 1). Pre-walking infants looked significantly longer
to the still frame after the incorrect compared to the correct continuations of the upright, but not the
inverted stepping actions. This demonstrates that motor experience is not necessary for predictive track-
ing of action kinematics. In a follow-up study (Experiment 2), we investigated sensorimotor cortex acti-
vation as a neural indication of predictive action tracking in another group of pre-walking infants. Infants
showed significantly more sensorimotor cortex activation during the occlusion of the upright stepping
actions that the infants in Experiment 1 could predictively track, than during the occlusion of the inverted
stepping actions that the infants in Experiment 1 could not predictively track. Taken together, these find-
ings are inconsistent with the idea that motor experience is necessary for the predictive tracking of action
kinematics, and suggest that infants may be able to use their extensive experience with observing others’
actions to generate real-time action predictions.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
From the moment they come into the world, infants are sur-
rounded by people who are performing actions that they are
unable to perform themselves. How infants form real-time predic-
tions about these actions is an important question considering the
crucial role action prediction plays in joint action, cooperation, and
collaboration (Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009). It has often been sug-
gested that to predict others’ actions, observers need to map the
actions onto their own motor repertoire (e.g. Knoblich & Flach,
2001; Neal & Kilner, 2010; Springer et al., 2011; Wilson &
Knoblich, 2005). The results of several behavioural and neurophys-
iological studies indeed suggest that the motor system plays a
functional role in action prediction in both infants and adults. For
example, performing incongruent actions (Springer et al., 2011)
or being restricted to act (Ambrosini, Sinigaglia, & Costantini,
2012) during action observation has been shown to interfere withparticipants’ prediction abilities, and eye-tracking studies have
demonstrated a relationship between infants’ developing motor
repertoire and their ability to predict other people’s actions
(Cannon & Woodward, 2012; Cannon, Woodward, Gredebäck,
von Hofsten, & Turek, 2012; Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck, & von
Hofsten, 2006; Gredebäck & Kochukhova, 2010; Gredebäck,
Stasiewicz, Falck-Ytter, Rosander, & von Hofsten, 2009; Kanakogi
& Itakura, 2011; Stapel, Hunnius, Meyer, & Bekkering, 2016). Fur-
thermore, neurophysiological studies suggest that the motor sys-
tem is recruited whenever observers are generating action
predictions (Kilner, Vargas, Duval, Blakemore, & Sirigu, 2004;
Ramnani & Miall, 2004; Southgate, Johnson, El Karoui, & Csibra,
2010; Southgate, Johnson, Osborne, & Csibra, 2009; Southgate &
Vernetti, 2014). For example, Southgate et al. (2009) found that
after observing a few repetitions of goal-directed reaching actions,
9-month-old infants began to show sensorimotor cortex activation
prior to the onset of the action, suggesting that they were antici-
pating the impending action.
Although these studies demonstrate that the motor system
plays a role in action prediction, there is still considerable debate
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system activation and action prediction has led some to suggest
that motor experience is crucial for action prediction. This account
proposes that observers automatically activate the motor repre-
sentations of the actions they observe, which in turn allows them
to understand and predict the goal of those actions (Flanagan &
Johansson, 2003; Green, Kochukhova, & Gredebäck, 2014; Möller,
Zimmer, & Aschersleben, 2015; Rat-Fischer, O’Regan, & Fagard,
2014; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). Thus, it follows from this
account that infants should be unable to predict actions that are
outside their motor repertoire because they lack access to a corre-
sponding functional motor representation.
Alternative accounts propose that actions are first interpreted at
some level of visual and/or conceptual analysis before they are
transformed into motor code (e.g., Csibra, 2007; Jacob, 2008;
Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007). The reconstruction of the motor
commands needed to perform the action allows the observer to
predict the visual consequences of the action by invoking the for-
ward model (Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001; Wolpert & Ghahramani,
2000), which is normally used to predict the sensory effects of
the observer’s own actions (Csibra, 2007). Furthermore, this
account suggests that when the observer is unable to perform
the observed action, he or she may activate the motor program
for an action that could bring about similar effects (Csibra, 2007;
Schubotz, 2007). Thus, while the first account claims that activa-
tion of a corresponding motor representation is a prerequisite for
recognising the action and predict its further course (Flanagan &
Johansson, 2003; Green et al., 2014; Rizzolatti et al., 2001), the sec-
ond account advocates that visual information alone is sufficient to
support action understanding, which in turn allows the observer to
use the motor system to predict how the action will unfold.
In support of this latter account, recent studies have demon-
strated that infants can predict actions irrespective of whether
these actions can be mapped onto a corresponding functional
motor representation (Biro, 2013). Furthermore, it has been shown
that the motor system plays a role in the prediction of such non-
executable actions (Southgate & Begus, 2013). However, as these
studies used self-propelled objects and claws, it is currently
unclear whether infants are also able to predict human actions that
are outside their motor repertoire. Another limitation of previous
work on action prediction in infancy is that the goal and the path
of the observed actions are often conflated, making it unclear
whether prediction of the goal state or movement path was mea-
sured (e.g., Cannon et al., 2012; Falck-Ytter et al., 2006;
Southgate & Begus, 2013).
In the current study we aimed to address these issues, and
advance the debate by focusing specifically on infants’ ability to
predict the kinematics of human actions and by asking whether
there is a need for motor competence. Based on previous work
with adult participants, we hypothesised that infants may be able
to use their previous visual experience to support the real-time
prediction1 of actions that are outside their motor repertoire, and
that they might activate motor programs for actions that can bring
about similar effects when doing so. For example, Cross, Stadler,
Parkinson, Schütz-Bosbach, and Prinz (2013) demonstrated that
visual training improved adult participants’ ability to predict intran-
sitive actions they had never performed before (such as the move-
ments of a gymnast or wind-up toy) and that this prediction
process was associated with activation of the motor system. In this
study, there was no goal object or location to guide participants’ pre-
dictions. Nevertheless, visual experience with the actions may have1 In this paper, the terms ‘predictive action tracking’ and ‘real-time action
prediction’ refer to mechanisms by which the kinematics or movement paths, rather
than the goal or the outcome, of observed actions are tracked and predicted in real
time.allowed participants to extract information about the temporal
dynamics of the observed actions, enabling them to activate motor
programs for alternative actions with similar dynamics to generate
predictions about how the actions would unfold (Schubotz, 2007).
We hypothesised that infants, who spend a considerable amount
of time simply watching the actions of people around them, may also
be able to use visual experience to support the real-time prediction
of actions that they have no motor experience with (Hunnius &
Bekkering, 2010, 2014), possibly by activating motor programs for
actions with similar temporal dynamics. The present study aimed
to investigate this idea by testing pre-walking infants’ ability to dif-
ferentiate between walking actions that continued either correctly
or incorrectly after a brief occlusion period, and the neural mecha-
nisms supporting this ability.2. Experiment 1: Looking time study
To measure predictive action tracking in infants, we adopted a
paradigm that has previously been used to investigate real-time
action prediction of point-light stimuli in adult participants (Graf
et al., 2007; Parkinson, Springer, & Prinz, 2012; Sparenberg,
Springer, & Prinz, 2012). Infants were presented with videos of
upright and inverted (upside-down) infant stepping actions that
were briefly occluded from view, followed by either a correct
(time-coherent) or an incorrect (time-incoherent) continuation of
the action. We then measured infants’ looking times to static test
postures after correctly versus incorrectly continued actions. We
used infant stepping stimuli because a previous study suggested
that visual experience with this type of action might trigger predic-
tive processes (de Klerk, Johnson, Heyes, & Southgate, 2015). We
used inverted stepping actions as control stimuli to check whether
extrapolation from the movement prime would be sufficient to eli-
cit predictive responses. We hypothesised that infants do not nec-
essarily need active motor experience, but can rely on their
previous observational experience with human actions to generate
real-time action predictions. Therefore, we predicted that pre-
walking infants would be able to distinguish between the correct
and incorrect continuations of visually familiar upright stepping
actions (as indicated by longer looking times to incorrectly contin-
ued actions compared to correctly continued actions), but not of
unfamiliar inverted stepping actions.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
The final sample consisted of 24 pre-walking 8-month-old
infants (M = 245 days; range 228–268 days). An additional nine
infants were tested but excluded because they did not provide
enough trials for analyses due to fussiness (N = 5), experimental
error (N = 1) or failure to engage with the stimuli (N = 3). Two more
infants were excluded because they did not fulfil the inclusion cri-
teria: one infant was born 5 weeks pre-term and another was
already cruising (walking while holding on to furniture). All
included infants were born full-term, healthy and with normal
birth weight. Written informed consent was obtained from the
infant’s caregiver prior to the start of the experiment.
2.1.2. Stimuli
The stimulus material for the test trials consisted of video clips
of six different infants performing stepping actions on an infant
treadmill filmed from a sagittal view (see de Klerk, Johnson,
Heyes et al., 2015). All stepping actions were rightward move-
ments but as the infants were on a treadmill, there was little hor-
izontal translation. Familiarisation stimuli consisted of three
infants performing bouncing actions on the infant treadmill. The
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black background to minimize distraction by the face or moving
arms. For the inverted condition the videos were flipped along
the vertical axis to invert the stimuli without changing the general
direction of the movement. This resulted in a total stimulus set of
12 test trials consisting of 6 upright and 6 inverted stepping
actions, and 6 familiarisation trials consisting of 3 upright and 3
inverted bouncing actions (see Fig. 1 for still frames of example
stimuli from the upright condition).
Stimuli started with a 1500 ms movement prime during which
the start of a stepping or bouncing action was presented. Hereafter
the action was occluded from view by a light grey occluder for
400 ms. This occlusion duration was chosen based on previous
studies with adult participants that showed that predictive track-
ing accuracy was highest when actions were occluded for 400 ms
(Graf et al., 2007; Springer & Prinz, 2010). Immediately after the
occlusion, the action either resumed at a frame that corresponded
to a time-coherent continuation of the action (i.e., 400 ms after the
last frame before occlusion) or at a frame too early or too late in the
action sequence (100 or +700 ms after the last frame before
occlusion). Similar time-shifts were used in previous studies with
adult participants (Graf et al., 2007; Springer & Prinz, 2010). This
resulted in four different trial types: upright correct, upright incor-
rect, inverted correct, inverted incorrect. In the familiarisation tri-
als, the continuation of the action was always time-coherent. In
both the familiarisation and test trials, the action continued for
600 ms after the occlusion before the image froze (see Fig. 1 for
the stimuli sequence).2.1.3. Design and procedure
Infants were seated on their caregiver’s lap in a darkened room
at a distance of approximately 60 cm from a 19-inch (4:3 aspect
ratio) CRT monitor on which the visual stimuli were presented.
Every trial started with a central attention-getter consisting of a
colourful, screensaver-like video that was accompanied by a sound.
Once the infant oriented towards the screen the experimenter trig-
gered the presentation of a trial. Infants were first presented with 3
upright and 3 inverted familiarisation trials to get accustomed to
the trial sequence. Hereafter a maximum of 16 test trials was pre-Fig. 1. Example still frames of a video fromsented; 4 upright correct, 4 upright incorrect, 4 inverted correct,
and 4 inverted incorrect trials. In half of the incorrect continuations
the continuation was too early, and in the other half the continua-
tion was too late. Preliminary analyses during pilot testing (N = 6)
revealed no looking time differences between the ‘too early’ and
‘too late’ continuations (main effect F(1,4) = 0.965, p = 0.382; inter-
action with trial type (upright or inverted), F(1,4) = 1.033,
p = 0.367), therefore these two types of ‘incorrect’ continuation
were collapsed.
The experimenter, who was hidden behind a curtain, assessed
infants’ looking times to the still frame after the correctly or incor-
rectly continued actions online. Trials ended when the infant
looked away from the screen for more than 2 consecutive seconds
or when 10 s (in the familiarisation trials) or 20 s (in the test trials)
had elapsed. Trials in which infants did not look at the entire
sequence of movement prime, occlusion, and continuation were
excluded from the analyses. Infants had to have at least 2 valid tri-
als in each of the four test trial types to be included in the analyses
(5 infants were excluded for not meeting this criterion). The order
of the four trial types (upright correct, upright incorrect, inverted
correct, and inverted incorrect) was counterbalanced between
infants, and this order was repeated up to four times or until the
infant’s attention could no longer be attracted towards the screen.
2.1.4. Data analysis
Looking times to the still frame after the continuation were
coded offline by two coders: the first author and a research assis-
tant who was blind to the design and hypothesis of the study.
The looking times of half of the infants were coded by both coders
and were highly correlated, r = 0.967, p < 0.001, with a mean abso-
lute difference of 316 ms. Analyses were carried out on the coding
of the first author. Only 11 out of the 24 infants had 3 or more valid
test trials in all four trial types. Therefore we decided to use the
first 2 valid test trials for each trial type for the analyses.
2.2. Results
Analyses were carried out on the mean looking times during the
first two valid trials for each of the four trial types (see Fig. 2).the ‘upright’ condition in Experiment 1.
Fig. 2. Average looking times to the still frame for the first two trials of each
condition. Significant differences between conditions are indicated, ⁄ p < 0.05. Error
bars represent SEM.
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participants (Csibra, Hernik, Mascaro, Tatone, & Lengyel, 2016),
the data were log-transformed prior to parametric analyses. A
repeated measures ANOVA with continuation (correct vs. incor-
rect) and orientation (upright vs. inverted) as within subjects fac-
tors demonstrated a main effect of continuation, F(1,23) = 5.702,
p = 0.026, g2p = 0.199. Although the interaction between continua-
tion and orientation was not significant, F(1,23) = 2.283,
p = 0.144, g2p = 0.090, the main effect of continuation, i.e., longer
looking times after the incorrect compared to the correct continu-
ations, seemed to be solely driven by the upright condition (see
Fig. 2). Planned comparisons indeed demonstrated that infants
looked significantly longer after the incorrect compared to the cor-
rect continuations of the upright, t(23) = 2.461, p = 0.022, but not
the inverted stepping actions, t(23) = 0.210, p = 0.836. Non-
parametric Wilcoxon tests further supported this finding: infants
looked longer after the incorrect compared to the correct continu-
ations of the upright stepping actions, Z = 2.257, p = 0.024, but not
of the inverted stepping actions, Z = 0.629, p = 0.530.
Previous work has shown that infants have a visual preference
for upright over inverted biological motion (Fox & McDaniel,
1982; Simion, Regolin, & Bulf, 2008). This raises the concern that
infants may have simply attended more to the upright compared
to the inverted stimuli, allowing them to distinguish between the
incorrect and correct continuations in the former condition only.
However, there was no main effect of orientation, F(1,23) =
1.613, p = 0.217, demonstrating that infants did not look longer
to the upright compared to the inverted stimuli. Additionally, there
were no differences in the number of invalid trials (i.e. trials in
which infants did not look at the entire sequence of events)
between the upright and inverted conditions, F(1,23) = 0.611,
p = 0.443. These findings suggest that our results were not driven
by differences in overt attention to the upright and inverted
stimuli.2.3. Discussion
Consistent with our prediction, the looking time results demon-
strated that infants were only able to distinguish between the cor-
rect and incorrect continuations of the stepping actions that were
presented from a visually familiar perspective. The significantly
longer looking times after the incorrect continuations of the
upright stepping actions demonstrate that infants’ expectations
about what the continued action should look like were violated.This suggests that they were able to maintain a representation of
the stepping action during the occlusion, which allowed them to
predict how the action should continue once the occluder disap-
peared. As our participants were not able to walk yet, this finding
demonstrates that motor experience is not necessary for accurate
predictive action tracking. Based on the findings of a previous
study, in which we found greater sensorimotor cortex activation
after repeated exposure to these infant stepping stimuli (de
Klerk, Johnson, Heyes et al., 2015), we were initially expecting that
infants might need visual training with the stimuli before they
would be able to predictively track the actions. However, instead
we found that infants were able to distinguish between the cor-
rectly and incorrectly continued actions without receiving any
visual training with the stimuli. These findings suggest that infants
in our previous study (de Klerk, Johnson, Heyes et al., 2015) were
also able to predict the kinematics of the stepping actions even
before being familiarised with the stimuli. However, possibly the
visual experience that these infants received over the course of
that study may have allowed them to make more exact predictions
about the stepping actions at post-test, such that even small devi-
ations from these predictions increased the prediction error and
hence the amount of sensorimotor alpha suppression (Cross
et al., 2012). These findings also suggest that previous visual expe-
rience with similar actions might be able to support real-time
action prediction. Although the treadmill-elicited infant stepping
actions that infants observed in these studies may seem quite dif-
ferent from the walking actions they typically observe in their
environment, it has been demonstrated that the EMG pattern
and rhythmicity of treadmill-elicited stepping actions in young
pre-walking infants (10 weeks to 10 months) show many of the
characteristics of adult walking (Yang, Stephens, & Vishram,
1998). Furthermore, research with adult participants has shown
that a relatively brief observational training (four times 45 min)
can generalise to a large extent to untrained stimuli (Cross et al.,
2013). Our results suggest that infants’ extensive observational
experience with walking actions may have allowed them to gener-
ate expectations about the temporal dynamics of the infant step-
ping stimuli in the present study. Possibly the activation of
motor programs for actions with similar temporal dynamics sup-
ported these fine-grained temporal predictions. Experiment 2
investigates this idea.
Our findings seem to be inconsistent with previous eye-tracking
studies that found that infants’ ability to predict actions depended
on their ability to competently perform the observed actions
(Cannon & Woodward, 2012; Cannon et al., 2012; Falck-Ytter
et al., 2006; Gredebäck & Kochukhova, 2010; Gredebäck et al.,
2009; Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011). The reason for this discrepancy
could be that while these previous studies measured infants’ antic-
ipatory saccades, the present study measured looking times. It has
been suggested that looking times and anticipatory saccades
reflect different types of processing, with the former reflecting post
hoc comparisons of expected and observed actions, and the latter
reflecting real-time expectations about how the actions will con-
tinue (Daum, Attig, Gunawan, Prinz, & Gredebäck, 2012). In most
looking time studies, the still image that is presented until the
infant looks away indeed contains information that allows the
infant to determine whether their expectation was violated or
not. In the incorrect trials in the current study, however, the expec-
tation that was violated was a temporal one, and the still image did
not provide any clues with regards to whether the continuation of
the action had been correct or incorrect. Infants’ expectations could
only be violated if they were able to dynamically maintain a repre-
sentation of the stepping action during the occlusion, allowing
them to predict what the action continuation should look like once
the occluder disappeared. Therefore, even though we used a
‘post-hoc’ measure, we did measure the result of real-time action
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ence between the previous anticipatory looking paradigms and
the current study is that even though infants needed to have a pre-
diction about how the actions would continue in both cases, the
present study did not require infants to generate an immediate
behavioural response based on this prediction. While anticipatory
looking paradigms require the infants to disengage from the ongo-
ing action and make an anticipatory saccade - which may be more
difficult when infants are less familiar with the actions - our
looking-time measure only required infants to look away from
the static image on the screen.3. Experiment 2: EEG
What neural mechanisms underlie infants’ ability to predic-
tively track actions that are outside their motor repertoire? One
possibility is that infants’ previous observational experience with
walking actions allowed them to activate motor programs for
alternative actions with similar temporal dynamics to support
their predictions about how the actions would unfold. This hypoth-
esis is based on the idea that the motor system is thought to be
involved in predicting a wide variety of events, ranging from com-
plex human movements that are outside the observers’ motor
repertoire (e.g. Cross et al., 2013), to sequences of abstract visual
stimuli (e.g. Schubotz & von Cramon, 2003) or the movement of
self-propelled objects (e.g. Southgate & Begus, 2013). Thus, con-
trary to the view that observers need to have access to a corre-
sponding functional motor representation for successful action
prediction, the motor system can be recruited for any kind of event
prediction. We hypothesised that if the sensorimotor cortex is
involved in predictive action tracking, independent of motor expe-
rience, we should find stronger sensorimotor cortex activation dur-
ing the occlusion of the visually familiar upright stepping actions
that, according to Experiment 1, infants are able to predictively
track, than during the occlusion of the visually unfamiliar inverted
stepping stimuli that they are unable to predictively track. Based
on the idea that perception of dynamic events is always predictive
in nature (Wilson & Knoblich, 2005), we expected sensorimotor
cortex activation to be present whenever there were events to pre-
dictively track. However, our analyses focused on the occlusion
period, as we hypothesised that sensorimotor alpha suppression
during this period would specifically be related to maintaining a
representation of the stepping action while it was no longer visible
on the screen, allowing infants to predict how the action should
continue once the occluder disappeared.
It has been suggested that when the observer is unable to per-
form the observed action, he or she may activate the motor pro-
gram for an action that could bring about similar effects (Csibra,
2007; Schubotz, 2007). In the present experiment kicking might
be such a potential alternative action, as seminal work by Esther
Thelen and colleagues has demonstrated that the rhythmical kick-
ing actions that pre-walking infants spontaneously perform have a
spatial and temporal organisation similar to mature walking
(Thelen, Bradshaw, & Ward, 1981). If the infants indeed activated
the motor programs for other rhythmical leg actions to facilitate
the predictive tracking of the stepping actions, we would expect
to see sensorimotor alpha suppression localized to the leg areas
(de Klerk, Johnson, & Southgate, 2015).
To investigate these hypotheses, we used electroencephalogra-
phy (EEG) to measure the attenuation of the sensorimotor alpha
rhythm as a measure of sensorimotor cortex activation (Marshall,
Young, & Meltzoff, 2011; Southgate et al., 2009; Southgate et al.,
2010) while a different group of pre-walking infants observedthe upright and inverted stepping stimuli that were employed in
Experiment 1.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
The final sample consisted of 16 pre-walking 8-month-old
infants (seven females, M = 247 days; range 225–272 days). An
additional 23 infants were tested but excluded because they did
not provide enough artefact-free trials for analyses due to move-
ment, fussiness, or poor signal quality (N = 22) or technical error
(N = 1). The final number of infants included and the percentage
of excluded participants are typical of EEG studies with infants
(e.g., Marshall et al., 2011; Southgate & Begus, 2013; Southgate
et al., 2009; Southgate et al., 2010). All included infants were born
full-term, healthy and with normal birth weight.3.1.2. Stimuli
Infants were presented with the same temporarily occluded
upright and inverted stepping actions that were used in Experi-
ment 1 (see Fig. 1). The only difference with Experiment 1 was that
the image froze only for 500 ms after the continuation of the
action. This allowed us to present more trials in the limited amount
of time infants would remain attentive and still during the EEG
session.
3.1.3. Design and procedure
The experiment was performed in the same testing environ-
ment as Experiment 1. The upright and inverted conditions were
presented in a random order. Each trial was preceded by a baseline
phase presenting infants with a colourful, screensaver-like video
accompanied by sounds. The duration of the baseline phase varied
randomly between 1650 and 2000 ms. The recording lasted up to
8 min or until the infant was no longer attending to the videos.
3.1.4. Recording and processing of EEG
EEG was recorded using a 128-channel Geodesic Sensor Net
(GSN; EGI Inc, Eugene, Oregon) at 500 Hz sampling rate with
respect to the vertex electrode. EEG data were segmented into
epochs of 4800 ms length around each trial, consisting of
1000 ms baseline, 1500 ms movement prime, 400 ms occlusion,
600 ms continuation, and 500 ms of still frame, plus a 400 ms buf-
fer on either side of the segment. Trials in which, according to the
video recording, the infant did not attend to the screen or made
any limbmovements were excluded. Furthermore, trials with addi-
tional EEG artefacts were rejected based on careful visual inspec-
tion. Only infants with at least 8 artefact-free trials per condition
were included in the analyses. Infants contributed a mean number
of 11.8 artefact-free upright trials (SD = 3.90, range: 8–20 trials)
and 11.6 artefact-free inverted trials (SD = 3.91, range: 8–21 trials)
to the analyses.
The artefact-free trials were re-referenced to the average EEG
activity, and then time-frequency analyses were performed on
them by continuous wavelet transform using Morlet wavelets at
1 Hz intervals in the 5–25 Hz range. To eliminate distortion created
by the wavelet transform, the first and last 400 ms of each trial
were removed after the transformation. Activity in the 6- to 9-
Hz-frequency range during 400 ms of the baseline period was sub-
tracted from the 400 ms occlusion period. Average wavelet coeffi-
cients were calculated for each infant by taking the mean across
the trials. We selected a cluster of electrodes (7, 31, 55, 80, 106
and Cz) over which the sensorimotor alpha rhythm is specifically
modulated by leg actions in infants (de Klerk, Johnson, &
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2008). To ensure that any effects were specific to the central leg
representation area we also analysed data over a cluster of elec-
trodes over the left sensorimotor area (30, 36, 37, 41, and 42) that
was predominantly activated during observation of manual actions
in previous infant studies (Southgate & Begus, 2013; Southgate
et al., 2009; Southgate et al., 2010). Additionally, to ensure that
our data specifically reflected changes in the sensorimotor alpha
rhythm and not the more posterior occipital alpha rhythm, we
included a cluster of occipital channels as well (electrodes 70, 71,
75, 76, and 83).
3.2. Results
A repeated measures ANOVA on alpha suppression during the
occlusion with orientation (upright vs. inverted) and channel
cluster location (left, central, and occipital) as within subjects
factors demonstrated a main effect of orientation, F(1,15) = 5.781,
p = 0.030, g2p = 0.278, a main effect of location, F(2,30) = 9.047,
p = 0.001, g2p = 0.376, and a marginally significant interaction
between orientation and location, F(2,30) = 3.273, p = 0.052,
g2p = 0.179. Bonferroni-corrected post hoc t-tests demonstrated sig-
nificantly weaker alpha suppression over the occipital channel
cluster compared to the left channel cluster, p = 0.001.
Follow-up repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted sepa-
rately for each channel cluster. These analyses demonstrated a sig-
nificant effect of orientation for the central (leg-area) channels, F
(1,15) = 9.252, p = 0.008, g2p = 0.381, which did not result from
differences in sensorimotor alpha activation during the baseline
period, F (1,15) = 0.129, p = 0.725. This finding demonstrates that
infants recruited their sensorimotor cortex significantly less (as
evidenced by an increase in sensorimotor alpha amplitude; see
Fig. 3) during the occlusion of the visually unfamiliar inverted step-
ping actions than during the occlusion of the familiar upright step-
ping actions. Non-parametric Wilcoxon tests further supported
this finding: infants showed less sensorimotor alpha suppression
during the occlusion of the inverted compared to the upright step-
ping stimuli, Z = 2.689, p = 0.007. There was no effect of orientation
on sensorimotor alpha suppression measured over the left and
occipital channel clusters, all ps > 0.305, demonstrating that these
results were specific to the central leg areas and independent of
the occipital alpha rhythm.
As can be seen in Fig. 3, the effects of orientation over the leg-
area were driven by a significant de-activation in the inverted con-
dition instead of by significant activation in the upright condition.
Possibly this absence of activation in the upright condition was dri-
ven by sensorimotor alpha suppression being present during the
baseline period in both conditions. To determine whether thisTime (ms) 
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Fig. 3. Time-frequency plots demonstrating the changes in sensorimotor alpha amplitud
the leg area. More negative amplitudes indicate more sensorimotor alpha suppression. T
frequency range over which statistics were computed.indeed was the case, we would ideally have used another baseline
period during which there was no suppression present (e.g., activa-
tion in response to observing a blank screen). Unfortunately, we
did not have such a period in our recording. Rather, we decided
to use as an alternative baseline the time when the image of the
upright or inverted legs was frozen on the screen, because during
this time there were no longer any movements to predictively
track. Thus, the last 400 ms of the still frame at the end of each
trial, during which there was no alpha-suppression in either of
the conditions, was adopted as an alternative baseline. Activity in
the 6- to 9-Hz frequency range during this 400 ms baseline period
was subtracted from the 400 ms occlusion period. Repeated-
measures analyses on sensorimotor alpha suppression calculated
with this new baseline demonstrated highly similar results. Again,
there was a significant main effect of location, F(2,30) = 16.337,
p < 0.001, g2p = 0.521, and a marginally significant interaction
between orientation and location, F(2,30) = 2.812, p = 0.076,
g2p = 0.158. Follow-up repeated measures ANOVAs again
demonstrated a significant effect of orientation over the central
channels, F(1,15) = 4.934, p = 0.042, g2p = 0.248, which did not
result from differences in sensorimotor alpha activation during
the baseline period, F (1,15) = 0.863, p = 0.368.
Thus, using the alternative baseline at the end of the trial, we
found that infants recruited their sensorimotor cortex (as evi-
denced by a decrease in sensorimotor alpha amplitude; see
Fig. 4) significantly more during the occlusion of the visually famil-
iar upright stepping actions than during the occlusion of the unfa-
miliar inverted stepping actions. Non-parametric Wilcoxon two-
tailed tests further supported this finding: infants showed more
sensorimotor alpha suppression during the occlusion of the upright
compared to the inverted stepping stimuli, Z = 2.327, p = 0.020.
Again we found no effect of orientation on sensorimotor alpha sup-
pression measured over the left and occipital channel clusters, all
ps > 0.360, demonstrating that the results were specific to the cen-
tral leg areas, and independent of the occipital alpha rhythm. As
can be seen in Fig. 4, in the upright condition there was a similar
amount of sensorimotor alpha suppression during the
screensaver-like baseline and during the movement prime and
occlusion. This finding suggests that infants might have been pre-
dicting that there would be upright stepping actions before the
onset of each trial (cf., Southgate et al., 2009). While in the upright
condition this prediction was maintained during the movement
prime and occlusion period, in the inverted condition infants’ pre-
dictions were violated resulting in de-activation of the sensorimo-
tor cortex. However, despite the significant difference between the
two conditions during occlusion, the sensorimotor alpha suppres-
sion in the upright condition was not significantly different from
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suppression. The zero point indicates the start of the video. Black rectangles indicate the time and frequency range over which statistics were computed.
C.C.J.M. de Klerk et al. / Brain and Cognition 109 (2016) 131–139 1373.3. Discussion
Infants produced significantly greater sensorimotor cortex acti-
vation during the occlusion of the visually familiar upright step-
ping actions, that infants in Experiment 1 could predict,
compared to during the occlusion of visually unfamiliar inverted
stepping actions that infants in Experiment 1 could not predict. This
finding is consistent with previous studies that demonstrated more
motor system involvement during the observation of visually
trained versus untrained stimuli (Burke, Tobler, Baddeley, &
Schultz, 2010; Cross, Kraemer, Hamilton, Kelley, & Grafton, 2009;
de Klerk, Johnson, Heyes et al., 2015; Frey & Gerry, 2006) and sup-
ports the idea that observational experience might shape the sen-
sorimotor regions of the brain in a similar manner as physical
experience does (Burke et al., 2010; Cross et al., 2009). Addition-
ally, these findings provide further support for the idea that motor
expertise is not a prerequisite for motor system activation during
action prediction (Abreu et al., 2012; Schubotz, 2007; Southgate
& Begus, 2013). The finding that the effects were specific to the
central leg areas is consistent with the idea that infants may have
activated motor programs for other leg actions, such as kicking,
that have similar temporal dynamics to walking (Thelen et al.,
1981). However, as the sensorimotor alpha suppression in the
upright condition was not significantly different from baseline,
these results preclude us from drawing firm conclusions about
the role of the motor system in predicting human actions outside
the infant’s motor repertoire. A possible explanation for the
absence of significant suppression from baseline is that fact that
the stepping actions were presented as isolated limbs on a video
display, as previous research has shown that actions observed in
live settings elicit greater sensorimotor cortex activation
(Ruysschaert, Warreyn, Wiersema, Metin, & Roeyers, 2013;
Shimada & Hiraki, 2006). Although previous sensorimotor alpha
studies have successfully used video stimuli in which only a part
of the actor’s body was visible (de Klerk, Johnson, Heyes et al.,
2015; de Klerk, Johnson, & Southgate, 2015; Southgate et al.,
2009; Southgate et al., 2010; Southgate & Begus, 2013), it is possi-
ble that seeing the actor’s whole body is particularly important to
obtain activation that is significantly different from baseline, and
future studies are needed to investigate this possibility.
The de-activation of the sensorimotor cortex during the obser-
vation of the highly unfamiliar inverted stepping actions in Exper-
iment 2 does not fit with the results of previous studies that
demonstrated greater activation of the motor system in infants
and adults during the observation of unfamiliar actions (Cross
et al., 2013; Grossmann, Cross, Ticini, & Daum, 2013; Stapel,
Hunnius, van Elk, & Bekkering, 2010). Possibly, some minimal level
of visual familiarity with the observed actions is required beforeinfants attempt to generate action predictions. Alternatively, after
infants failed to predictively track the inverted actions during the
first few trials they may have given up trying to generate predic-
tions for this type of stimulus, resulting in de-activation of the
sensorimotor cortex. However, these interpretations remain spec-
ulative and future research is needed to systematically investigate
the relationship between motor system activation during action
prediction and visual and motor familiarity with the observed
actions in infancy (Grossmann et al., 2013).
4. General discussion
In recent years, much attention has been focused on the notion
that having access to a corresponding functional motor representa-
tion is a crucial prerequisite for the ability to predict observed
actions (e.g. Cannon & Woodward, 2012; Cannon et al., 2012;
Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Gredebäck & Kochukhova, 2010;
Gredebäck et al., 2009; Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011; Stapel et al.,
2016). As a result of this focus on the role of motor experience in
action prediction, very little research has been conducted to inves-
tigate alternative mechanisms through which infants can under-
stand and predict others’ actions while their motor repertoire is
still developing. The results of the present study show that infants
are able to make surprisingly fine-grained predictions about the
kinematics of human actions that are outside their motor reper-
toire, and that the sensorimotor cortex may play a role in this pre-
dictive tracking process. Pre-walking infants distinguished
between correctly and incorrectly continued stepping actions that
were presented from a visually familiar perspective only, suggest-
ing that visual experience alone may be sufficient to support suc-
cessful predictive action tracking. These findings are consistent
with previous studies that have demonstrated that infants can pre-
dict events for which they do not have access to a corresponding
functional motor representation (i.e., non-human actions such as
self-propelled objects and claws) (Biro, 2013; Southgate & Begus,
2013) and that suggest that observational experience can facilitate
the activation of motor representations for unfamiliar actions
(Boyer & Bertenthal, 2016). The present study extends these results
by demonstrating that infants can generate real-time action pre-
dictions for human actions that are not yet part of their motor
repertoire. Taken together, these findings provide evidence against
the idea that predictive tracking of human actions requires motor
experience with the observed actions.
Motor activation during action prediction is thought to be the
result of an action reconstruction process during which observed
actions are first interpreted at some level of visual or conceptual
analysis, after which they are transformed into motor code
allowing the observer to predictively track the visual consequences
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2000). When the observer is unable to perform the observed
action, he or she may activate the motor program for an action that
could bring about similar effects (Csibra, 2007; Schubotz, 2007).
This model suggests that infants in the current experiment may
have employed a mid-level visual interpretation of the stepping
actions (e.g., the left leg is moving upwards and forwards with a
certain pace), which the motor system attempted to approximate
using the motor programs available to the infant. This internal
motor representation in turn would have allowed infants to main-
tain a representation of the stepping action during the occlusion,
enabling them to predict what the action should look like once
the occluder disappeared.
The model by Schubotz (2007) proposes that observers activate
the motor program for an action that most closely matches the rel-
evant properties of the observed action. The finding that the senso-
rimotor alpha effects were localised to the central leg areas
suggests that infants may have activated the motor program for
other rhythmical leg movements, such as kicking, to predict the
observed stepping actions. However, as the sensorimotor alpha
suppression during the observation of the upright stepping actions
was not significantly different from baseline, the results of Exper-
iment 2 need to be interpreted with caution. A possible explana-
tion for the absence of significant suppression is that the actions
were presented on video rather than live, as previous studies have
found stronger sensorimotor alpha suppression for live presenta-
tions (Ruysschaert et al., 2013; Shimada & Hiraki, 2006). Neverthe-
less, the current findings are inconclusive, and do not allow us to
draw firm conclusions about whether or not motor mechanisms
play a functional role in the predictive tracking of human actions
that are outside the infant’s motor repertoire. We also cannot
exclude the possibility that infants relied on perceptual expecta-
tions without involvement of the motor system to differentiate
between the correctly and incorrectly continued stepping actions.
Future studies will need to address this question more directly,
preferably by simultaneously obtaining behavioural measures of
predictive action tracking and neurophysiological measures of
motor system activation to investigate whether there is a func-
tional link between the two in infancy.
Based on the action reconstruction account discussed above,
one would expect that prediction accuracy will be modulated by
the similarity between the motor commands activated in the
observer and those needed to perform the observed action, and
studies with adult participants have indeed confirmed this is the
case (e.g. Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 2008; Diersch, Cross,
Stadler, Schütz-Bosbach, & Rieger, 2012; Knoblich & Flach, 2001;
Knoblich, Seigerschmidt, Flach, & Prinz, 2002). Therefore with
increasing competency in performing actions, the accuracy of
infants’ action predictions is also expected to increase (e.g.
Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011; Stapel et al., 2016). Although
this relationship between action expertise and prediction is
well-documented, it is important to note that experience only
modulates, but does not determine, the ability to predict actions
(Schubotz, 2007).
We found that pre-walking infants were able to distinguish
between the correct and incorrect continuations of stepping
actions that were presented in a visually familiar orientation.
Although infants did not receive any visual training with the stim-
uli, it is possible that they were able to learn about the temporal
dynamics of the stepping actions over the course of the experi-
ment. However, the difference in looking times between the cor-
rectly and incorrectly continued upright stepping actions was
already marginally significant when only the first valid trial of each
condition was included in the analysis (t(23) = 1.855, p = 0.076),
and it seems unlikely that infants received sufficient experience
with the stepping stimuli during those first few trials for visuallearning to take place. A more plausible possibility is that even
though the infants did not have previous experience with observ-
ing infant stepping actions, they were able to generalise from their
extensive experience with observing others’ walking actions to
predict the kinematics of the infant stepping actions. Evidence
from a study on the effects of visual training on predictive action
tracking in adult participants supports the idea of such generalisa-
tion from ‘trained’ to ‘untrained’ stimuli (Cross et al., 2013).
However, this raises the question of why infants were unable to
generalise from their observational experience with upright walk-
ing to predictively track the inverted stepping actions. Even though
the low-level visual and motion features are highly similar for
upright and inverted actions, infants do not have any experience
with observing upside down actions. Because of this lack of expe-
rience, and/or because of the fact that inverted actions violate grav-
itational constraints, infants may have been unable to recognise
the inverted stimuli as a familiar human shape (Bertenthal,
Proffitt, & Kramer, 1987; Troje & Westhoff, 2006). The finding that
infants were unable to predictively track the inverted actions is
consistent with previous studies with adult participants in which
real-time action prediction also broke down when actions were
inverted (Graf et al., 2007; Sparenberg et al., 2012). One final pos-
sibility that would explain both the adult work and the present
findings is that humans may possess an inborn ability to represent
the temporal dynamics of upright biological motion, and future
research with newborn infants could shed light on this question.
4.1. Conclusions
Although active action experience undeniably provides infants
with a rich source of information about human actions, the results
of the current study demonstrate that it is not necessary for suc-
cessful predictive action tracking. Instead, our findings suggest that
infants can generate fine-grained temporal predictions about the
kinematics of others’ actions, possibly based on previous visual
experience, without being able to map the observed actions onto
a motor representation for the same action. The focus on the rela-
tionship between infants’ ability to perform and predict actions
may have led researchers to overlook other ways in which infants
can learn about the actions of the people around them. Considering
the important role real-time action prediction plays in joint action,
cooperation, and collaboration (Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009), future
studies should further investigate, using measures that do not
require an immediate behavioural response, the mechanisms by
which infants can understand and predict others’ actions while
their motor repertoire is still developing.
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